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 Chapter Three 
Growth Rates, Economic Structures, and Energy Use 
 
This chapter is about the growth and development performance of non-
industrialized countries in the latter part of the twentieth century, in particular the “great 
divergence” of their growth rates of per capita GDP from those of the industrial world 
since around 1980 until the early part of the 2000s that was illustrated in Chapter 2. The 
goal is to explore the factors underlying observed patterns of growth, and trace out 
plausible lines of causation for their diversity. The analysis follows Kuznets (1966) in 
attempting to organize the data in such a way as to highlight salient relationships, or the 
lack thereof, among key economic variables. 
To keep the discussion within bounds, the data are organized in terms of 12 
regional groups including 57 developing and transition countries: rapidly growing East 
Asian economies (or the “Tigers”), Southeast Asia, China, South Asia, semi-
industrialized countries (mostly from Latin America but also South Africa and Turkey 
with economic structures similar to their counterparts in the Western Hemisphere), the 
smaller Andean countries, Central America and the Caribbean, “representative” and 
“other” countries in sub-Saharan Africa1, the Middle East and Northern Africa, Central 
and Eastern Europe, and Russia and Ukraine representing the former USSR. The 
nations in each group are listed in Appendix 3.1. 
 
                                                 
1 The representative group is made up of four countries often discussed in the 
development literature, and the others are included essentially on grounds of data 
availability. 
 1
 Divergence in the Twentieth Century and Patterns of Output Growth 
To set the discussion Figure 3.1 shows GDP and sectoral per capita output 
growth rates by region since 1970 in constant 1990 US dollars.2 We identify three 
cohorts of regions and countries that had similar patterns of growth: 
There was sustained growth in the Tigers, China, Southeast Asia, and South 
Asia (dominated by India) at rates substantially higher than the 2% target discussed in 
Chapter 1. Relative to the other regions, South Asia had less robust expansion and 
Southeast Asia did not bounce back as strongly from the 1997 crisis as did the Tigers. 
These regions “diverged upwardly” from the rest of the developing world. 
 The second, slow growth group includes the semi-industrialized countries, 
Central America and Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle Eastern 
and Northern African region. Many of these countries had grown at fair rates in the 
1970s but then experienced a crisis either in the 1980s, the 1990s, or both, followed by 
growth in the late twentieth and, more commonly, in the early twenty-first century. Over 
the period 1970-2006, the Central and Eastern European region grew at comparable 
rates with those recorded by South Asians (3.9% vs. 4.2% per year) but because of the 
transition shock around 1990 it seems more appropriate to call its case one of slow 
growth followed by a late recovery. It must also be mentioned that the recent expansion 
in the Central and Eastern European countries has benefitted a great deal from 
                                                 
2 We use here data in constant US dollars rather than in the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) terms customarily utilized in international income comparisons (as for example in 
Chapter 2). The reason, as explained in Appendix 3.2, is that PPP estimates distort the 
macroeconomic relationships that are at the heart of our analysis in this and the 
following chapters. When it comes to policy formation, it is far more useful to think about 
macro relationships in traditional “real” terms (see, on this, Chapter 1). 
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 geopolitical advantages related to their accession to European Union at  the beginning 
of the twenty-first century.  
Finally, the two African regions (with Other Africa dominated by Nigeria), the 
smaller Andean economies, the Middle East and Northern Africa, and Russia and 
Ukraine were either stagnant throughout the period or experienced volatile economic 
expansion. Along the lines discussed in Chapter 2, data from recent years show that 
Representative Africa, Russia and Ukraine, and some of the smaller Andean economies 
(notably Peru) began to grow again.  





























































































Figure 3.1: Sectoral growth rates 1970-2006 
Source: UN National Accounts database. 
Note: MENA stands for stands for Middle East and northern Africa; CAC stands for Central America and 
the Caribbean 
 
Differences in overall growth rates were closely associated with significant 
changes in the patterns of output growth. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 present scatter plots of 
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 per capita GDP growth in agriculture and industry versus the percentage changes in 
their respective sectoral shares for all the regions. The rapidly growing Asian countries 
identified in Figure 3.1 showed substantial shifts in shares, in the classic movement 
from primary toward secondary and tertiary sectors. 
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Figure 3.2: Growth performance and structural change in agriculture 
Source: UN National Accounts database. 
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 Figure 3.3: Growth performance and structural change in industry 
Source: UN National Accounts database. 
 
Figure 3.2 for the agricultural share shows a negatively sloped regression line for 
the whole 12-region sample. In all regions, except Russia and Ukraine (where 
agriculture gained less than one percentage point over the period), agriculture tended to 
grow less than GDP. But contrast the results for the five fast-growing regions with those 
for the others. While the former show a clear relationship between faster output growth 
and a decreasing share, the lagging seven regions generate a random scatter – a result 
that will repeat itself for several other indicators of structural change. Among the rapid 
growers, China’s agricultural share fell by an astonishing 35 percentage points over the 
period! In South and Southeast Asia, agriculture saw its output share decline 23 and 17 
percentage points respectively. Similar observations apply to the industrial sector and 
service sectors with clear associations emerging for the rapid growers and ill-defined 
data clouds for the other regions. Growth goes hand-in-hand with a strong pattern of 
structural change, whereas the absence of growth does not. 
The growing regions had rising industrial shares as can be observed in Figure 
3.3 (less so in Central and Eastern Europe, which prior to 1970 had already been 
aggressively pushed toward industrial specialization). Most of the other regions suffered 
from stagnation or a reversal of the industrialization process. The Middle Eastern and 
Northern African countries in fact experienced a decline in the share of the mining 
sector set off by the OPEC embargo on crude oil exports to the Western world and the 
energy crisis of the 1970s. Since then, the region’s mining and oil output in total GDP 
has hovered around 20% from a high of 34% in 1970.  
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 Finally, the fast growers had predictably large service sector shares by the end of 
the period, in accordance with traditional development theory. The Tiger region service 
share, which stood at 57% in 2006, supported strong job creation as reported below. 
There was no apparent relationship for the lagging regions. 
 
Identifying Structural Change 
As already suggested by Figures 3.2 and 3.3, sustained growth in successful 
regions was associated with changes in economic structure in several dimensions. 
Recognizing the structural shifts that occurred in the regions with consistent growth can 
help chart future directions that other developing economies may be able to take. 
Needless to say, any economy is a unique entity with its own characteristics that require 
its own policies. But stylized facts show that there are dynamic movements of key 
macro variables that show up in connection with sustained output growth across 
different economic systems. The slow growers did not generate such changes for 
reasons already discussed in Chapter 1. Growth over years and decades in per capita 
output requires economic transformation characterized by higher productivity and 
increasing returns to scale. The evidence supports this point of view. 
Throughout this chapter we analyze these movements from several angles, in 
terms of formalized decomposition exercises (algebraic details in Appendix 3.2) and 
more informal analysis of data on human capital accumulation and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
One decomposition breaks down labor productivity growth between agricultural, 
industrial (manufacturing, construction and mining), and service sectors. Overall 
 6
 productivity growth comes out as an average of own-rates of growth of the three 
sectors, weighted by output shares, along with “reallocation effects”. These effects are 
positive for sectors with relatively low average productivity in which employment falls or 
for high-productivity sectors in which employment rises.3  
 A second exercise focuses on growth rates of the economy-wide employment to 
population ratio, which is decomposed into an average of growth rates of that ratio in 
the three sectors weighted by employment shares. At both the national and sectoral 
levels, the ratio of employment to total population will rise if the growth rate of output per 
capita exceeds growth of labor productivity.4 An economy can be considered to be 
performing well if it has both sustained productivity growth and a stable or rising 
employment-population ratio. 
 Third, we examine the association between capital stock and output growth. We 
also contrast growth rates of labor and capital productivity and ask how they feed into 
widely used but fundamentally misleading calculations of “total factor productivity 
growth” or TFPG. A simple accounting identity states that the growth rate of labor 
productivity is equal to the sum of the growth rates of capital productivity and the 
capital/labor ratio. The formula helps explain the “Asian” pattern of falling capital 
productivity over time. As pointed out in Chapter 1, a similar identity applies to the 
growth rates of labor and energy productivity. The details are presented below. 
 
Labor Productivity Growth 
                                                 
3 The approach follows Syrquin (1986). 
4 The original insight is Pasinetti’s (1981). The decomposition holds true if labor force 
participation rates are stable. 
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  Historically, labor productivity increases have been the major contributing factor 
to growth in real GDP per capita. At the same time, faster productivity increases cut into 
employment growth unless they are offset by rising effective demand. Figure 3.4 shows 
the direct contribution of each of the three sectors to overall productivity growth for the 
period 1991-2003/4. The five rapidly growing regions had productivity growth rates 
exceeding – some to a significant degree – the rich country norm of 2% per year. The 
others fell well short, and the former USSR had negative productivity growth5. Figure 
3.5 summarizes sectoral reallocation gains and together with Figure 3.4 it provides a 
complete picture of how each sector contributed to overall productivity growth. 
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5 More detailed results (not presented here) show that Russia/Ukraine suffered an 
enormous productivity collapse (-9.7% per year) in 1991-1995, but then recovered to 
5.6% (1999-2003). 
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 Figure 3.4: Sectoral contribution to productivity growth. 
Sources: International Labour Office, GET database, for employment and World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2005 database, for output. 
 
Sectoral contribution to productivity growth through reallocation gains: 1990-2003/4
-1.5% -1.0% -0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0%




Central America and the Caribbean
Semi-industrialized countries
Russia and Ukraine







Figure 3.5: Sectoral contribution to productivity growth through reallocation gains 
Sources: International Labour Office, GET database, for employment and World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 2005 database, for output.  
 
 Productivity growth in agricultural sector evidently did not play a crucial role in the 
process. In several countries agriculture’s reallocation effects were negative. The 
meaning is that this sector, with its relatively low average productivity, had positive 
employment growth. This finding is not surprising in regions such as China, South Asia, 
and Africa, where agriculture’s share in total employment is significant, but the result is 
slightly discordant in the Middle East and Northern Africa. More disquieting is the 
sector’s poor productivity performance in sub-Saharan Africa, where it employs most of 
the labor force. 
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  The industrial sector’s own productivity growth made a substantial contribution to 
the total in four of the rapidly growing regions (Figure 3.4). The direct contribution of 
nearly 6% per year in China is striking. Industry made a visible contribution in the two 
poorer Western Hemisphere regions – Central America and the Caribbean and the 
Andeans – but detracted from overall performance in the semi-industrialized countries, 
Russia and Ukraine and the Middle East and Northern Africa. The strongest reallocation 
contribution of industry was experienced in Southeast Asia, a clear outlier in this regard, 
followed by the Middle East and Northern Africa (Figure 3.5).  
 Services also added to productivity in the rapid growers: as with industry, a 
negative direct but positive reallocation contribution in Southeast Asia. Elsewhere, the 
direct contribution from services was typically negative with modest positive 
contributions from reallocation. This distinction among regions has implications for job 
creation, as taken up below. 
 Finally, from an alternative data set we were able to do decompositions for the 
period 1980-2000 for the four Asian regions (1986 as the starting year for South Asia). 
The results are in Figure 3.6. The same general pattern holds as in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, 
with services playing a more important role in the Tigers. 
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Productivity Decomposition for Asian Regions: 1980(6)-2000
























Figure 3.6: Productivity decomposition for selected Asian regions 
Source: Employment data is from the International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development 
http://www.icsead.or.jp. Data for sectoral output is from UN National Accounts database. 
 
 The bottom line on productivity growth is that the two non-agricultural sectors 
made solid contributions to the total in the fast-growing regions, even as their overall 
importance in the economy rose. Elsewhere the results were a mixed bag, with no clear 
patterns emerging. Insofar as it is measured by average labor productivity growth, 
technological advance was evident in the successful regions and absent or, at best, 
sporadically present in other corners of the world. 
 A common route taken by mainstream models of economic growth is to link 
productivity and ultimately economic growth to the accumulation of human capital. The 
question to ask is if rapid GDP growth in the regions surveyed in this book was 
associated with the pace of human capital accumulation, measured by average years of 
schooling? Figure 3.7 presents a scatter plot of GDP growth per capita vs. growth in 
average years of schooling. All regions raised their education levels, some quite 
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 substantially. At best, the regression line suggests a very weak positive relationship 
(certainly not significant in statistical terms) between output expansion and educational 
growth. As in Figures 3.2-3.3, and in contrast to the picture for physical capital 
accumulation in Figure 3.9 below, the slow-growing regions inhabit an amorphous data 
cloud. They did no worse at accumulating human capital than the others but they saw 
scant returns in growth. In fact some did considerably better at increasing years of 
schooling than the fastest growing region, China.  
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Figure 3.7: Economic growth and educational improvements 
Sources: Data on education is from Barro and Lee (2000) 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html; data on growth rates of GDP per capita is from UN 
National Accounts database. 
 
Education is a public good that should be supported for many reasons, but over 
the medium run its contribution to more rapid real income growth appears to be modest. 
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 More human capital may be a necessary or an enabling condition for sustained output 
growth, but it is clearly not sufficient. 
  
Employment Growth Patterns 
 Figure 3.8 summarizes results regarding shifts in sectoral employment to 
population ratios in terms of their contributions to changes in the economy-wide ratio. 
Regional growth rates of the overall ratio hovered around zero, with more positive than 
negative values. As noted above, at both the sectoral and national levels, the ratio(s) 
will grow when the growth rate of output per capita exceeds labor productivity growth. 
The ratio(s) will also tend to rise when population growth is negative, as was the case in 
Central Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
 
Sectoral Contribution to Employment: 1991-2003/4
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 Figure 3.8: Sectoral shifts in employment/population ratios. 
Sources: International Labour Office, GET database, for employment and World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2005 database, for output. 
 
 The most striking outcome in Figure 3.8 is the apparent similarity of all 12 regions 
in the sense that services showed a rising employment to output ratio everywhere, 
rather strongly except in Other Africa, the Middle East and Northern Africa, and (to an 
extent) South Asia (dominated by India). The details, however, differed between fast- 
and slow-growing regions. 
For the rapid growers, the positive contribution of services to employment growth 
shows that output per capita grew faster than the sector’s rising  productivity levels that 
underlie its positive contributions to growth overall (in Figure 3.4). Positive reallocation 
gains were due to the fact that services have relatively high average productivity. In the 
slower growing regions, direct contributions of services to economy-wide productivity 
were generally negative (in five of the seven slow growth or stagnant regions), 
indicating that a large part of the job creation in services was in low-productivity or 
informal activities. Underemployment in services turned out to be the major mechanism 
to absorb the excess supply of labor in these economies. Still, given the higher average 
productivity of services, reallocation effects (reflected in Figure 3.8) added to overall 
productivity growth. Only in the Middle East and Northern Africa and in Southeast Asia 
was the industrial sector a strong provider of jobs (a fact explaining Southeast Asian 
industry’s strong reallocation contribution to overall productivity growth in Figure 3.4).  
Consistent with Figures 3.1 and 3.4, industry’s rate of productivity growth tended 
to exceed its growth in demand per capita. An old structuralist observation in 
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 development economics is that the industrial sector is the main motor for productivity 
increases but not for job creation. 
Finally, relative to total population, agriculture was a net source of labor supply in 
nine regions, very strongly in Southeast Asia, and a source of net demand – or, to be 
precise, an absorber of underemployment— in the Middle East and Northern Africa, 
Other Africa, and (especially) in the smaller Andean countries. 
 
Capital Productivity and Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG) 
 To analyze the role of capital accumulation in growth, we computed capital stock 
growth rates for the regions by cumulating real gross fixed capital formation over time 
from a postulated initial level of the capital stock (capital-output ratio of 2.5) with a 
depreciation rate of 5%. As discussed more fully in Appendix 3.2, after a decade or two 
such estimates of the capital growth rate should be insensitive to the parameters 
because capital stock growth tends to converge to investment growth over time.6 
 Figure 3.9 compares growth rates of output and the capital stock. In contrast to 
most other indicators discussed herein, there is a clear positive association between the 
two growth rates across all regions – a standard empirical result. This relationship is 
usually thought to emerge from the supply side, but it could also be attributed to 
demand. In a simple demand-driven growth model, if investment increases at a certain 
rate, then output and (as just indicated) the capital stock will ultimately grow at that rate 
as well. The fact that the slope of the putative relationship between the two growth rates 
                                                 
6 A caveat: our capital stock series for the former-USSR and Central and Eastern 
Europe begin in 1990, which means that the estimated growth rates are less reliable 
than those for other regions where the base year was 1970. 
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 in Figure 3.9 is close to one argues more for demand- than supply-side causality. In the 
latter, the slope would lie below 45 degrees, with a less than one-for-one partial impact 
of faster capital growth on output growth.7 
 Also note that the capital growth rate exceeded output growth in the Tigers, 
China, Southeast Asia and the former USSR. In other words, these regions had falling 
capital productivity. Such an outcome can be expected in the rapidly growing Asian 
regions where industrial restructuring took place towards capital-intensive industries. 
Nevertheless these findings can also be said to be the outcome of accounting 
requirements. As noted in Chapter 1 and demonstrated in Appendix 3.2, a  theorem of 
accounting demonstrates that the difference between labor and capital productivity 
growth rates must be equal to the difference between capital and labor growth rates. If 
capital grows faster than labor, then labor productivity has to grow faster than capital 
productivity.8 If the capital to labor ratio rises very rapidly, then capital productivity 
growth may even have to be negative. This outcome is sometimes said to characterize 
an “Asian” pattern of growth, or a “Marx bias” in technical progress. It can also result 
from negative labor force growth as in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. 
                                                 
7 That is, the 45-degree slope would not fit a neoclassical aggregate production 
function. It could be “explained” by a constant capital-output ratio, but that in turn is 
inconsistent with the “Asian” pattern of falling capital productivity discussed immediately 
below. 
8 This sort of “decreasing returns” to more capital is built into many mainstream and 
heterodox growth models, which mostly serve to rationalize the accounting identity 
described in the text. As noted in Chapter 1, falling capital productivity (in PPP terms) 
characterized many now industrialized countries in their rapid growth periods in the 
nineteeth and early twentieth centuries. 
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Figure 3.9: Output and capital stock growth rates, 1990-2004. 
Sources: GFCF and GDP data comes from World Development Indicators 2005 database; employment 
data is from International Labour Office, GET database 
 
 Capital and labor productivity growth rates are plotted in Figure 3.10. Again note 
the contrast between regions. The rapid growers all had negative or nearly zero capital 
productivity growth rates and rising labor productivity which could have resulted from 
better technology “embodied” in new capital goods. Detailed data show that China’s 
capital productivity fell more rapidly over time. The former USSR lost on both fronts and 
the rest had small, mostly positive, growth of both indicators.  
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Productivity growth rates of factors of production and TFPG: 1991-2004/2
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Productivity growth rates of factors of production and TFPG: 1991-2004/2
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Figure 3.10: Capital and labor productivity growth rates and TFPG. 
Sources: GFCF and GDP data comes from World Development Indicators 2005 database; employment 
data is from International Labour Office, GET database 
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 Much of the academic literature focuses on “total factor productivity growth” 
(TFPG) or the “residual.” In chapter 1 we pointed out the dubious way in which the 
share of remunerated labor is calculated in developing countries and the equally 
inadequate interpretation of a negative TFPG in rapidly growing economies. As an 
exercise, Figure 3.10 shows estimates of TFPG for labor shares of 0.4 and 0.7 (the 
standard number) respectively. Either way, because of their negative capital productivity 
growth, TFPG in the rapidly growing regions fell well short of labor productivity growth. 
For the lower labor share, TFPG in the Tigers and Southeast Asia was close to zero. 
Such findings are often used to portray the failings of the “Asian model,” but mostly they 
reflect an accounting identity and the arbitrary nature of the TFPG indicator.  
A more interesting question would be to ask whether the rapid growth of the 
capital stock in these economies impacted labor productivity through embodied 
technical change (and the slow growth of the capital stock the poor productivity 
performance of other regions), but this is a question we cannot directly address with our 
data set. 
What we can ask however is whether foreign direct investment, which is often 
touted as a potential source of technologically upgraded physical capital, managerial 
know-how, and global commercial networks, has any impact on productivity and 
economic growth. However, it is not obvious in this regard what level of FDI is 
“significant”. As a share of GDP, for example, how large does FDI have to be or how 
rapidly should it grow to generate important repercussions on output growth?  
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 FDI tends to fluctuate over time although as a share of GDP it remains 
insignificant or modest at best in most of the developing world. More exactly, for the fast 
growing Tigers FDI as a share of GDP increased from 1.6% in 1970 to 3.1% by 2004. 
Somewhat similar patterns appeared in Southeast Asia and China – which absorbed a 
very substantial share of the worldwide total— but not in South Asia, where FDI/GDP 
peaked at a mere 0.9% in 1997. Central and Eastern Europe experienced a late but 
sharper increase of FDI as a share of GDP than Southeastern Asia: from 0.4% in 1990 
to 4.8% in 2000 and 4 % in 2004. Russia received relatively little FDI: it peaked at 1.7% 
of GDP in 1999.  
Central America and the Caribbean had strong fluctuations – nearly 4% in the 
1970s down to 0.4% in 1982, back to above 4% in the 1990s with the assembly/tourism 
boom, and then some decline. Latin America saw a modest 2% toward the end of the 
period. Some members of the slow-growing group of economies did similarly or a little 
better than the fast-growers in garnering FDI, without a lot of apparent pay-off. The 
smaller Andean countries were up to 5.5% in 1993 and 3% in 2004, with no positive 
impact on growth. Finally, Africa and the Middle East and Northern Africa got negligible 
quantities of FDI.  
 The above narrative on the shares of FDI in GDP reveals that a positively sloped 
relationship between FDI and GDP growth is likely to show up for Asia, as usual – with 
the exception of South Asia in this case. The remaining regions demonstrate their usual 
blob of data points. A relatively large FDI inflow may possibly have a slightly stronger 
association with growth than rising education, but the relationship is still very weak. 
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 Energy Productivity Growth and Energy/Labor Ratios 
 There is an old idea, perhaps dating to the nineteenth century “energetics” 
movement (Martinez-Alier with Schlüpmann, 1991; Mirowski, 1989), that the crucial 
factor behind rising labor productivity and per capita income is increasing use of energy. 
One can make this statement a bit more precise by comparing growth rates of labor 
productivity, energy productivity, and the energy/labor ratio. As noted above, the latter 
two growth rates must add up to the first as an algebraic identity.  
 For our 12 regional groups and the rich countries in the OECD, Figure 3.11 
presents two scatter diagrams of growth rates of labor productivity and the energy/labor 
ratio, for the periods 1970-1990 and 1990-2004 (energy from fossil fuel sources only). 
As with the growth rate of capital stock, there appears to be a positive relationship 
between increasing energy use per worker and labor productivity growth, with a steeper 
slope and a better fit in the latter period. Similar results show up when growth rates are 
compared at the individual country level. The slope of the relationship in the latter period 
is around 0.6, implying a substantial contribution of more energy use to higher labor 
productivity. 
 21





































































Figure 3.11: Growth rates of labor productivity and the energy/labor ratio. 
Sources: Energy data is from United Nations Energy Statistics Yearbook, GDP levels are from UN 
National Accounts, employment is from Groningen Growth and Development Center http://www.ggdc.net/
 The data behind Figure 3.11 show a wide range of annual energy/labor ratios – 
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 from 0.01 (77 gallons of gasoline) in sub-Saharan Africa to 0.67 (5150 gallons) in Saudi 
Arabia in 2004. The ratio is 0.58 in the US and less than 0.3 in Western European 
countries, the Tigers, and Japan (as discussed in chapter 1, the numbers are in units of 
terajoules of energy per worker per year). 
 In the context of global warming, the numbers are far from encouraging. For 
example, at China’s growth rate of the energy/labor ratio of 4% per year, it would take 
the economy around 35 years to attain Sweden’s “moderate” ratio of 0.16, with energy 
productivity rising 4% per year more slowly than labor productivity. As its per capita 
income rises and possibilities for appropriating more advanced technologies and taking 
advantage of surplus labor recede, China’s labor productivity growth rate will almost 
certainly decline, perhaps creating even greater reliance on energy. 
 As observed in Chapter 1, developing countries might have to reduce their fossil 
fuel energy/labor ratios by one percent per year to hold greenhouse gas emissions in 
check. A handful of countries are in this range, but they are stagnant with negligible or 
negative labor productivity growth.  
 The key policy question is whether in the near future rich country energy/labor 
ratios can be reduced (or energy productivity increased relative to labor productivity) 
substantially by technological innovation and social rearrangements. In the recent 
period, there has been no significant downward trend in the ratios in the industrialized 
world. But if such innovations do work out, then perhaps they can be passed to 
developing economies before the momentum of their population growth overwhelms all 
possibilities for combating global warming. Given the environmental constraints and 
considering that only 16% of the world’s population lives in rich countries and almost all 
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 population growth is in the poor ones, realistic prospects for successful economic 
performance and poverty alleviation may not be very bright. 
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 Appendix 3.1: Countries in the Regional Groups 
1. Representative Africa: Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
2. Other Africa: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Zimbabwe 
3. Central America and the Caribbean: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica 
4. Smaller Andean countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru 
5. Semi-Industrialized countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Venezuela, Turkey, South Africa 
6. South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
7. China 
8. Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam 
9. Tigers: South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan 
10. Middle East and Northern Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, 
Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen 
11. Former-USSR: Russian Federation, Ukraine 




 Appendix 3.2: Decomposition Techniques 
 It is often illuminating to trace through how macro aggregates shift over time by 
temporally “decomposing” accounting identities that link them together. In this appendix 
we present procedures for investigating changes in labor productivity across producing 
sectors, employment generation by sectors, interactions between labor and capital 
productivity growth at the economy-wide level, and net borrowing by major institutional 
sectors.9 
 Available data on output and employment come at yearly intervals. Growth rates 
have to be computed in discrete time, with formulas that can become quite complicated. 
To simplify an algebraic presentation as much as possible, we consider only 
observations at times 0 and 1. The growth rate of (say) the variable X is “X-hat” or 
 with the subscripts standing for points in time. At time 0, the relevant 
identity for decomposing labor productivity growth is 
001 /)(ˆ XXXX 
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i XX 00 with the as output 
levels by sector ( ). Let  be the share of sector i in real output in 
period zero. Similarly for employment:  with 
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. The level of labor 
productivity in sector i is  with an exact growth rate between times 0 and 1 of 





ii LXL ˆ)ˆ  iiiL XL ˆ()ˆ1( 1   1)ˆ  L
 After a bit of manipulation, an exact expression for the rate of growth of 
economy-wide labor productivity emerges as 
                                                 
9 More detail on the analysis to follow is in Rada and Taylor (2006) and Taylor and 
Rada (2006). 
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Aside from the interaction term , 1)ˆ1(  L L  decomposes into two parts. One is a 
weighted average  of sectoral rates of productivity growth as conventionally 







iii Lˆ)( 00  , 
captures "reallocation effects." If  sector ii 00   i  has a bigger share in output than 
employment, implying that it has relatively high average productivity. Positive 
employment growth in that sector (or a negative  in a sector with ) will increase 
productivity overall, in line with established theories about dualism in development 
economics. 
iLˆ ii 00  
 For the record, another expression for L  emerges after rearrangement of (1), 
     .     (2)   
i
iiiiii
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In (2), sectoral productivity growth rates are weighted by employment shares, and the 
reallocation effect is stated in terms of output growth rates. The message is basically 
the same as in (1). 
 Turning to employment generation, a fundamental insight is that if a sector 
creates jobs over time, then (if interaction terms are ignored) its growth rate of output 
per capita must exceed its growth rate of labor productivity. To see the details we can 
start with the identity 
i
iii PXXLPL )/)(/(/ 0000000  in which  is the population at time 
zero. That is, 
0P
0  is the share of the population employed at time 0. Labor-output ratios 
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 (inverse average productivity levels) by sector are  and sectoral output levels 
per capita are .  
iii
o XLb 00 /
000 / PX
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 After grinding, the growth rate of   can be expressed as 
  
i
ib )ˆˆ   iiii b ˆˆˆ(0 
)ˆii L
)ˆ1( iL
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with the  being the sectoral employment shares introduced above and  as a 
(presumably small) interaction term. Each sector’s growth rate of labor productivity is 
 so that it is related to the growth rate of the labor/output ratio as 
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with the terms multiplying  capturing the interactions.  iL
 The lead term (typically accurate to two or three significant digits) is 
  . 
i
ˆ 
The growth rate of the employment/population ratio is a weighted average of differences 
between sectoral growth rates of output per capita and productivity. Sectors with higher 
shares of total employment  contribute more strongly to the average. One might 
expect that  in a “dynamic” sector, with the inequality reversed in one that is 




 Next we consider labor and capital productivity in tandem on an economy-wide 
basis. Exact expressions for the growth rates of the two variables are 
LXLXLL ˆ)ˆˆ()ˆ1(
1     and KXKXKK ˆ)ˆˆ()ˆ1( 1  

 )/(ˆ 00 KIK I
. The growth of capital stock is 
given by the standard equation  in which  is gross fixed capital formation 0
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 and  is a “radioactive” depreciation rate (approximately equal to the inverse of the 
average lifetime of a capital good). 
We estimated the capital stock growth rates used in the text by running the 
accumulation equation forward through time from an initial guess at the level of capital 
(from a capital to output ratio of 2.5) and a depreciation rate of 0.05. After a decade or 
so, the computed growth rates were insensitive to these parameters. This outcome is 
more or less built into the algebra. If investment grows at a rate g, for example, then the 
capital stock growth rate will converge to that value, independent of initial conditions 
and the value of  . 
 Usually, labor and capital productivity growth rates are lumped together into a 
number called “total factor productivity growth” (TFPG) or, more realistically, the 
“residual”  . It is defined from the equation 
         (4)   KLKLX KL ˆ)1(ˆ)ˆ)(1()ˆ(ˆ 0000
in which 0 is the share of labor in total factor payments. Evidently,   is a weighted 
average of capital and labor productivity growth rates, 
 KL  )1( 00   .       (5) 
 Equation (4) can be derived by taking the first difference of the factor payments 
identity built into the national accounts, 00000 KrLX    (in which 0  and  are real 
wage and profit rates respectively), or else from the usual mainstream mumbo-jumbo 
about an aggregate production function and associated marginal productivity factor 
demand equations.  
0r













LX   
the expression 
         (6) LKKL ˆˆ  
will hold to a good approximation. In words, if growth rates of labor and capital are pre-
determined then the growth rate of labor productivity implies the growth rate of capital 
productivity or vice-versa. If capital grows much more rapidly than labor and there is 
positive labor productivity growth, then the growth rate of capital productivity may well 
be negative. Empirical implications of this observation are discussed in the text. 
One final point worth emphasizing is that all the discussion is framed in terms of 
macro aggregates measured in real market prices, not in terms of purchasing power 
parity. The rationale is to keep the analysis as close as possible to normal 
macroeconomic discourse. 
When used in international comparisons, PPP calculations basically revalue the 
labor content of output by sector. For example, the dollar cost of an up-market haircut in 
Mumbai at the current rupee/dollar exchange rate might be $5. A similar service in New 
York City could run $50. A PPP re-computation of Indian GDP raises the labor cost for 
the Mumbai barber to something closer to that of her New York counterpart.  
Comparisons of income levels in these terms have been become the accepted 
methodology, as in the results reported in Figure 2.1. However, PPP computations also 
move macro aggregates far away from their “normal” market price levels. Non-traded 
goods are re-valued in comparison to traded goods, the residential capital stock rises 
and non-residential falls, imports change relative to exports, and so on. In the text, we 
focus on standard macroeconomics, and for that reason we eschew PPP.  
